THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO PUBLIC
PROPAGANDA
RIcHAR T. DAviEs*

I have been involved for the past twenty years in the practice of American
diplomacy. Five of those years have been spent working closely with, or in, the
American foreign information program. Despite this, the subject I have been
assigned seems to me to embody a question. My immediate reaction is to assume
that I must prove an American commitment to propaganda, that this is not something we can take for granted, like the American commitment to the right to private
property or to baseball as the national sport. That that should be so is hardly strange
to those who have lived through the history of the postwar years. But it is a measure
of the tentativeness many still feel when they think about this commitment.
Our country itself is peculiarly a creation of propagandists. The inspired pamphleteers who fanned the flames of revolution in America went on to proclaim their
beliefs in a Declaration evoked by "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind,"
and then proceeded to "form a more perfect Union." These were men of the pen,
publicists of the highest sort, who advanced their ends by public argument in debates
which produced great state documents.
We believed, for over 170 years, that it was but necessary to say these things
among ourselves, to be ourselves a beacon unto the world, and that, beyond our
shores, men would see, understand, and of their own volition repair to the banner we
had unfurled.
America, the exemplar, the avatar, of freedom, we thought, would draw men's
minds, hearts, and hopes like a magnet and, by being itself, would work great
changes in the world.
And, of course, it has done so and continues to do so.
But that something more was needed, except during the emergency conditions of
wartime, was a concept foreign to American minds before 1945. Like so many new
ideas, the view that the American Government should maintain a permanent organization devoted to telling the rest of mankind about the United States had a painful
birth, a wretched childhood, and a stormy adolescence. If we now regard it as
coming into man's estate, we do so with understandable caution.
Yet it is as dear, I think, as these things can well be that the United States
is now quite thoroughly committed to speaking officially to the rest of the world
about itself, about problems of common concern to it and other nations, and about
its dreams, fears, and hopes for the future.
* A.B. 1942, Columbia College. Assistant Director (Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), U.S. Information Agency.
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ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITM[ENT

A great deal has been said and written about the "cold war" as the major cause
which gave rise to the United States commitment to a foreign propaganda program,
and there is no doubt that, on a narrow reading of the evidence, it is quite correct
so to present the matter. I should like here, however, to direct some remarks towards
broadening this traditional framework of thinking about our official propaganda
effort.

The United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War
as the two superpowers. The international order had been shattered during the war
and the seven or eight states which, before the war, could be considered "great
powers," had undergone a sharp and radical reordering of stature. Since the two
postwar superpowers possessed totally different philosophies of government and
totally different ideas about the nature of international relations and, consequently,
about their relationships to each other and to third states, a struggle between the two,
each surrounded by its allies, was inevitable. Under these circumstances, an important part of that larger struggle was bound to be the "struggle for men's minds,"
to use the phrase of which we heard more ten years ago than we do today.
The Soviet Government may, with great justice, claim to have originated modern
mass psychologico-political warfare, when Trotsky, at Brest-Litovsk, insisted upon
publicizing each day's transactions, thus attempting to appeal over the head of the
German Government to the German people and, more particularly, to the rankand-file of the German army. Its subsequent concentration upon propaganda
abroad made it the leader in this field. Confronted with so practiced an adversary,
the United States was bound to react and itself to establish an organization for the
conduct of propaganda abroad.
Thus, as is the case with so many other political, economic, and diplomatic
phenomena of the postwar period, the "cold war" was the father of the United States
foreign-propaganda effort. At the same time, historians of the subject point quite
correctly to the spread of the media of mass communications, and particularly radio,
during the inter-war period, as greatly facilitating this development. But to say
that much, and say no more, is to explain only the immediate impulse and the timing
of the initiation of the American peacetime commitment to propaganda abroad and
to ignore the fact that, sooner or later, we should have made such a commitment,
whether there had ever been a "cold war" or not. The "cold war" was instrumental
in producing the commitment, but not decisive. The decisive factor was our emergence as a world power. Indeed, the moment when, I should say, it was first quite
clear we should sooner or later embark on an overseas information program was
rather the end of the First World War than of the Second.
A world power, such as we already were in the i92os and 1930s, simply cannot
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operate in the modern world without informing the peoples of other nations of what
it is doing about matters of common international interest, and why. In fact, we
were then doing so, in however crude and rudimentary a form, without adequate
recognition of that fact. The issuance of press releases by the Department of State,
which dates from 1922, and the inception in 1929 of press briefings by the Secretary
of State or a press spokesman of the Department, were two clear symptoms of our
movement in this direction. And, of course, private American efforts abroad, of
an informational and cultural character, were already of long standing when the
Second World War began. They found their clearest expression in the American
universities and teachers in the Near East and China.
This is neither the place nor time to delve in detail into all the evidence I think
exists to support the thesis that, during the 192os and i93os, we were moving surely,
however slowly, towards the basic commitment to overseas propaganda which we
now have.
If we view our foreign-propaganda effort in these terms, we can see that the "cold
war" was a catalyst which greatly hastened the involvement of the United States
government in organized propaganda abroad but which led us to view its goals
and modes in a peculiar light, not necessarily the one which would have illuminated
them if it had been the product of an evolutionary development. If we compare the
development of America's effort with that of such an older great power as Great
Britain, we can see that evolutionary growth of a foreign-propaganda apparatus in
what we may regard as a more normal sequence. Practices and institutions developed
at a relatively unhurried pace. The Foreign Office devised ways and means of
communicating British views to the world through the institution of the privileged
press briefing and through the quasi-official mechanisms of The Times and Reuters.
The BBC early began to broadcast abroad because of the desirability of linking the
metropole by radio with the outposts of empire. Abroad, it was the normal function
of British diplomats to brief the local British correspondent. And, in time, too, the
concept of the British Council grew up to deal with a longer-range type of informational and cultural activity.
I suggest, therefore, that, following the shock of forced growth of the American
propaganda system evoked by the "cold war," we are now gradually resuming the
development of what we should in any case have had: a nucleus of official informational, cultural, and educational activities, around which there lies a whole range of
private American activities, from education and scientific research to the dissemination of American television programs.
II
Ti

MODES OF THE UNITED STATEs COMMITMENT

If we recognize, then, that, as the result of a process of development which has
taken place in all states of any significant power, the United States has quite naturally
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developed a commitment to propaganda, that leaves us with a number of problems.

The first of these is, what is propaganda?
A narrow definition of the term would conform to that which I gather from
the literature distributed by the organizers of this symposium would most nearly
correspond to what they have in mind. That is to say, propaganda is here treated
essentially as informational, commentary, and feature materials dealing with the
substance of international affairs, with the activities of the originating country that
bear upon its relations with other states, and with the activities of other countries in
the sphere of their relations with other states.
A broad definition would recognize the significance of materials and activities
outside and apart from the narrow range of international relations. It would
embrace cultural relations, relations between educational institutions, relations
between scientists and technicians, relations between institutions and persons in the
field of the creative and performing arts, and a whole panorama of activities, which,
in this country, are the province of nongovernmental organizations but which have
either a potential or an actual significance for America's relations with other countries.
It is quite clear that it is towards the broad, rather than the narrow, definition
that our development in this field is tending. President Johnson's speech of Sep-

tember i6, 1965, at the Smithsonian Institution was a significant signpost pointing in
this direction and the International Education and Health bills introduced into the
Congress at the beginning of February 1966 represent a major new effort to implement this concept.
Now, it may seem misleading, or even harmful, to say that international cultural,
educational, and artistic activities are "propaganda." But, if we use the word in its
altogether neutral sense, as connoting the spreading of information, it is clear that

they are, and the best kind of propaganda at that. In discussing the process of
communication, Edward R. Murrow used to describe the thousands of miles an
instruction had to travel from Washington to an American diplomatic post overseas
before it could be delivered by an American official to an official of the local
Foreign Ministry, and he stressed that the most crucial portion of its journey were
the last six feet, from the lips of the American diplomat to the ears of the foreign
official. There is no more effective medium of communication than face-to-face
contact, and, increasingly, we, and the other states interested in influencing the
opinions of others, have been turning to it and will increasingly do so in the
future.
The need which moves us in the direction of broadening the concept of propaganda to include many forms of international communication not hitherto usually
thought of under that title, arises from the increasing interpenetration of human societies. It is generally accepted that science is international, and so, increasingly, are
art, literature, economics, sociology, technology, and medicine. There is scarcely a
field in which we cannot learn something from other nations and they cannot learn
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something from us. In that process, we inevitably learn something about other
nations, and they learn something about us. It is this process, and its expansion,
to which we are increasingly committed.
A second problem arising from the United States commitment to propaganda is,
what is its proper content? Here, we can try an answer in two dimensions: the
first, narrow, the second, broad.
Narrowly considered, the problem of content is bounded by two primary criteria.
The first is credibility. In an open society, it is quite impossible for an official
propaganda organization to make believe that certain things do not exist and, in its
output, to ignore them. The domestic commercial media and the large resident
corps of foreign correspondents, subject to no constraints, will surely report those
things, regardless of what the official organization does, or does not do, about them.
So that, all other considerations quite apart, the official organization is compelled
to deal with them if it wishes its audience abroad to rely upon it for accuracy, speed,
and comprehensiveness in the treatment of news. And if the audience does not
regard the official medium as credible, its sponsors might as well save themselves the
time, trouble, and money of maintaining it.
The second criterion is accuracy of reflection of national policy. It is a characteristic of a free press that it thrives on criticism and conflict. The American press
quite correctly prides itself upon fulfilling, to a very substantial extent, the role
of a loyal opposition and of a constant critic of government at all levels. This is as
it should be.
But if one of USIA's media-the Voice of America, let us say-were to restrict
itself simply to parroting the headlines and leading articles of the American press,
it would, on some issues, convey to its foreign audience a distorted impression which
highlighted only those aspects of the event headlined in the press and ignored much
of the context in which it occurred. It thus becomes a function of the Voice of
America to place the news in context, to report, first of all, the facts of rioting in the
Watts district of Los Angeles, then to try to explain why the Watts rioting occurred,
and finally to place this event and its causes within the context of the evolution of
American society and the changing relationship of the American Negro to his fellow
Americans. It would be misleading if any of these elements of the story were
reported without the others.
Looked at in the broad aspect, the problem of content is a good deal simpler.
It rests upon the fact that Americans, whatever their occupations or interests, are going
to be themselves. By and large, we are interested in other people, in their reactions
to us and to our country, and are anxious to help them understand us. The foreigner who visits this country goes away, not with too little information or too few
impressions upon which to form a judgment about it, but with the opposite difficulty,
that of trying to bring some order into a mass of information and a welter of impressions.
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The third problem is, what are we trying to achieve through our commitment
to propaganda?
It is easy to be at once too modest and too demanding in our views of what can
be achieved by propaganda. On the one hand, we can never measure with clinical
precision the effect of this or that aspect of our effort and decide accordingly to add
an hour of broadcast time in this language and take away an hour in that, to discontinue this publication and commence one of a different type, in order to achieve
a calculated effect upon the audiences in question. This does not mean, however,
that the effect of our efforts cannot be gauged, however roughly, by experienced
propagandists. On the other hand, we should not hope to change the shape of the
world through propaganda. We can hope to change attitudes, but attitudes are not
synonymous with actions. Actions more often result from immediate physical and
social stimuli than from appeals from abroad, however cleverly conceived.
In the narrow sense, our propaganda should convey to the rest of the world an
accurate picture of what we are doing in the United States, why we are doing it,
and what we hope to achieve thereby.
In the broad sense, we are attempting to impart to the world some of the lessons
we have learned in coping with problems of increasing complexity in the most
advanced of the developed countries. We are attempting to make our experience,
in coping with our problems, relevant to those which other societies confront or will
confront as they themselves develop.
We have a peculiar responsibility in this. Together with all the people of the
world, we are moving at an ever-increasing pace into realms of social and economic
development never before entered by man. We must solve problems of a magnitude
unimaginable only twenty, or even ten, years ago. At the same time, we help
other nations to profit by what we learn in doing this, just as we ourselves, throughout our history, have built upon the experience and accumulated wisdom of others.
CONCLUSION

I began by saying that the subject assigned me, the American commitment to
public propaganda, seemed still to embody a question. And, of course, it does.
The question is not whether the United States is committed to propaganda abroad.
It is, and it must be. The question is whether we will deal successfully with the
task. This task is not one which government can or should monopolize. It is one
in which we should draw upon the whole range of our resources, using them all in
proper proportion and balance. Finally, it is one to the solution of which we will
all make a contribution, simply by virtue of the fact that we are citizens of America.
What we do and how we do it cannot fail to interest the rest of the world. Behind
the propaganda of the word is that of the deed. Neither is sufficient by itself.
Together, right deeds and right words are the only effective propaganda.

